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The waking mind is often occupied with mental contents that are minimally constrained
by events in the here and now. These self-generated thoughts—e.g., mind-wandering
or daydreaming—interfere with external task performance and can be a marker for
unhappiness and even psychiatric problems. They also occupy our thoughts for upwards
of half of the time, and under non-demanding conditions they (i) allow us to connect our
past and future selves together, (ii) help us make successful long-term plans and (iii) can
provide a source of creative inspiration. The lengths that the mind goes to self-generate
thought, coupled with its apparent functionality, suggest that the mind places a higher
priority on such cognition than on many other mental acts. Although mind-wandering may
be unpleasant for the individual who experiences it and disruptive to the tasks of the
moment, self-generated thought allows consciousness freedom from the here and now
and so reflects a key evolutionary adaptation for the mind. Here we synthesize recent
literature from cognitive and clinical psychology and propose two formal hypotheses that
(1) highlight task context and thought content as critical factors that constrain the costs
and benefits of self-generated thought and (2) provide direction on ways to investigate the
costs and benefits from an impartial perspective.
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When reading this article there may be moments when the prose
that makes up the narrative does not form the basis of you
thoughts. Some of these thoughts may seem trivial: Did you
lock your car? Perhaps you should check your phone to see if
you received an email? Others may entail ideas with implica-
tions for your life—who you will marry, what course you will
take, or why you want to pursue a career in science. First studied
almost fifty years ago (Singer and Antrobus, 1963, 1965; Klinger,
1966, 1967; Klinger and McNelly, 1969), in the last decade these
self-generated thoughts (aka mind-wandering or daydreaming)
have become an important topic of research (Raichle et al., 2001;
Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Mason et al., 2007).
At times we can all find our minds’ tendency to self-generate
thought unrelated to what we are doing annoying, and this
intuition is supported by a growing body of research. Self-
generated thought occupies our thoughts when our mood is low
(Smallwood et al., 2009a) and can contribute to future unhap-
piness (Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). Task unrelated self-
generated thought is also disruptive to the goals of the moment:
It interferes with the models we build when we read a novel
(Smallwood et al., 2008; McVay and Kane, 2012a,b), reduces
external vigilance (McVay and Kane, 2009, 2012a,b) and its occur-
rence can influence estimates of a person’s intelligence (Mrazek
et al., 2012). Together these qualities provide us with a strong
impression that self-generated thought is an unintended lapse
because we all want to be happy and to perform tasks to the best
of our abilities.
Despite our sense that self-generated thought can be an irri-
tant, this interpretation is unnecessarily simplistic. Humans spent
almost half of the day engaged in the experience (Klinger andCox,
1987–1988; Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010) and any behavior
that occupies such a large amount of time is a strong candidate
for consideration as normal, if not important. Indeed, over the
last two decades neuroimaging has revealed that almost all of
the neural systems that are employed in the service of explicit
external tasks exhibit spontaneous activity during the resting state
(Biswal et al., 1995; Smith et al., 2009). Thus while we may find
mind-wandering frustrating, both neural and experiential evi-
dence demonstrates that mental activity that is independent from
external stimulation is a normal rather than an exceptional state.
The situation is even more complex once it is recognized
that self-generated thought has demonstrable benefits. Mind-
wandering often involves a focus on our future or reflec-
tions about our past (Smallwood et al., 2009b; Smallwood and
O’Connor, 2011; Stawarczyk et al., 2011), and such forms of
mental time-travel allow us to devote conscious thought to the
connections between our past and future selves and who we
are now (Tulving, 1987; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007). Self-
generated thought can enhance creativity (Baird et al., 2012),
helps consolidate self-memories (Smallwood et al., 2011) and
is linked to a style of long-term decision making characterized
by patience rather than impulsivity (Smallwood et al., 2013).
Mind-wandering is thus associated with skills like creativity, plan-
ning and delaying gratification and so reflects capacities that are
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necessary to navigate the complex social environment in which
we exist (Frith and Frith, 2007).
Evidence that self-generated thought is normal, coupled with
its apparent functionality suggests that our natural inclination to
dismiss mind-wandering as a lapse is more simplistic than it is
realistic. This paper develops the idea that the current view of
mind-wandering employed by many researchers is unnecessarily
narrow and considers this argument with specific reference to the
methodology that studies employ, the focus of intervention stud-
ies and the conceptual perspectives with which the phenomenon
that self-generated thought is approached. By developing these
themes we propose two formal hypotheses that (1) highlight
task context and thought content as critical factors constraining
the costs and benefits of self-generated thought and (2) provide
direction on ways to investigate the costs and benefits from an
impartial perspective.
THE METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: CONTEXT MATTERS
When investigating any particular psychological phenomena the
experimenter must choose a context in which to embed his or
her research, and this decision is important because it can influ-
ence the results and impact upon the interpretations of the data.
There are many factors that affect the choice of a particular
paradigm, and there is one that is especially important when
choosing how to conduct a mind-wandering experiment: the
extent to which the task paradigm in which self-generated thought
is measured demands continuous attention. There is a recent trend
in research on mind-wandering to use experimental contexts that
assess task unrelated thinking in the context of complex tasks
(such as encoding, reading, an n-back working memory task,
or measures of fluid intelligence: Smallwood et al., 2003, 2008;
McVay and Kane, 2009, 2012a,b; Mrazek et al., 2012). These
tasks demand attention in a continuous manner and are in sharp
contrast to earlier research into mind-wandering which favored
simpler tasks (Antrobus et al., 1967). Although in both cases
experimenters are interested in exploring the experience of task
unrelated thought, these different experimental conditions offer
quite different advantages vis-a-vis their utility as a context to
measure our capacity to generate thought that does not arise from
sensory input.
Complex demanding tasks provide the opportunity to assess
mind-wandering in a context in which the experience has out-
competed a pertinent external task, thus allowing the experi-
menter the chance to gauge the deleterious consequences on task
performance. They are also a context when the mind-wandering
experience is relatively uncommon and in which a conscientious
and motivated participant is likely to be inclined against engag-
ing in self-generated thought. By contrast, simple undemanding
tasks require few cognitive resources and allow for a more fre-
quent mind-wandering experience. Simple tasks are also closer to
the environment in which we are likely to experience most self-
generated thoughts in daily life (e.g., when we are stuck in a traffic
jam, jogging, or are brushing our teeth).
The choice of a difficult or an easy task paradigm leads
to non-trivial differences in experimental results and thus
influences the interpretations that the authors place on the
mind-wandering state. For example, in complex demanding
experimental conditions, task unrelated thoughts lead to signif-
icant disruptions in behavioral performance, including absent
minded forgetting (Smallwood et al., 2003), poor reading com-
prehension (Smallwood et al., 2008; Reichle et al., 2010), and poor
encoding of material into long-term memory (Smallwood et al.,
2003). By contrast, almost without exception, all of the adaptive
features of self-generated thought are observed in less demand-
ing situations: greater freedom to consider the future (Smallwood
et al., 2009b), greater opportunity to think creatively (Baird et al.,
2012), and an association with economic choices that are patient
rather than impulsive (Smallwood et al., 2013). Importantly in
both contexts the dependent measure is the same: the assessment
of task unrelated thoughts based on participants’ self-reports.
Whereas authors conducting experiments in complex task envi-
ronments are justified in describing task unrelated thought as a
lapse of attention, experimenters using simpler task environments
are justified in describing their results as evidence of the capacity
of self-generated thought to facilitate many of the features that
are critical to the human condition. A simple difference in the
task context, thus, leads to radical differences in how the experi-
ence is interpreted by the researcher and thus the perspective from
which scientists, and society at large, view the mind-wandering
state.
These contextual differences in the correlates of task unre-
lated thought occur because the experience is an example of a
psychological state. Just as different behavioral states cannot be
related to different personality traits without taking into con-
text the situation in which behavior evolves (Mischel and Ayduk,
2002), the self-generated thoughts and feelings that people expe-
rience are not independent of the context in which they occur.
Mind-wandering under conditions when the external environ-
ment demands attention carries with it significant risk and so
when task unrelated thought occurs under these conditions it is
more likely to signify performance disruptions, cognitive prob-
lems, risk taking or lowmotivation to perform a task. By contrast,
when the environment lacks compelling inputs, the risks asso-
ciated with self-generated thought are substantially reduced and
not devoting cognitive resources to the environment allows the
motivated individual the chance to consider longer term goals and
objectives. The lack of independence of key features of the mind-
wandering experience from the context in which it is measured
indicates that certain first order claims regarding the relation-
ship between self-generated thought and other variables will not
generalize to every situation.
These findings lead to our first hypothesis surrounding the
factors that constrain the costs and benefits of self-generated
thought. According to the context-regulation hypothesis (Box 1),
the capacity to regulate the occurrence of self-generated thought
so as to minimize the risk of the experience derailing on-going
task performance is indicative of a cognitive system that is func-
tioning in an adaptive manner. Here we are interested in the
concept of adaptive behavior in the sense of a well-adjusted
cognitive system rather than in a strictly evolutionary sense. In
addition to contextual influences on ongoing behavioral perfor-
mance, the context-regulation hypothesis makes an important
prediction about individual variability in the adaptive nature of
self-generated thought. In particular, it predicts that individuals
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Box 1 | The Context Regulation Hypothesis.
The capacity to regulate the occurrence of self-generated
thought (SGT) so as to minimize the risk of the experience
derailing on-going task performance is indicative of a cognitive
system that is functioning in an adaptive manner.
- SGT is most common in non-demanding contexts.
Self-generated thought occurs less frequently when individu-
als perform demanding external tasks (e.g., Antrobus et al.,
1967, 1970; Teasdale et al., 1995; Smallwood et al., 2004,
2007, 2009b; Mason et al., 2007).
- The costs and benefits of SGT are context dependent.
SGT under conditions that demand continuous attention is
unproductive because it can be a source of error (McVay and
Kane, 2009, 2012a,b; Mrazek et al., 2012).
SGT under non-demanding situations is beneficial because
it is associated with capacities such as creativity, patience
and better cognitive control (Baird et al., 2011, 2012; Levinson
et al., 2012; Smallwood et al., 2013).
- Experimental Considerations.
Since the complexity of a given task environment is always
relative, self-generated thought should be measured across a
range of different contexts.
The relative cognitive capacities of the individual will deter-
mine the extent to which he/she is able to successfully
perform more complex tasks while simultaneously engaging
in self-generated thought.
who are able to limit its occurrence to non-demanding situations
will experience the fewest costs and the greatest benefits of
self-generated thought. Indeed, existing studies provide initial
support for this prediction: individuals who mind-wander to
a greater degree under non-demanding conditions and/or to a
lesser degree under demanding conditions have a higher work-
ing memory capacity (Kane et al., 2007; McVay and Kane, 2009;
Levinson et al., 2012) greater creativity (Baird et al., 2012), and
demonstrate patient and prospective as opposed to impulsive and
immediate choices (Smallwood et al., 2013).
Rather than assuming that the task context does not mat-
ter, as research has often tended to do, future studies should
attempt to measure the experience across different conditions and
to provide detail regarding how mind-wandering relates to differ-
ent psychological features in different contexts. Ideally these task
environments should be varied systematically in terms of cogni-
tive processes that are thought to influence the mind-wandering
state. Examples might include varying the complexity of percep-
tual input (e.g., Forster and Lavie, 2009) the extent of practice
with the task (Teasdale et al., 1995; Mason et al., 2007), the
amount of working memory allocated to the task (Smallwood
et al., 2009b). By looking simultaneously across carefully cho-
sen task conditions, researchers are not limited to making general
statements regarding how certain types of psychological states
relate to the mind-wandering experience. Instead, by assuming
that the context matters, researchers can design experiments to
allow them to make targeted statements regarding the condi-
tions under which individuals’ pre-dispositions toward particular
types of mind-wandering under specified task conditions relate to
particular psychological costs or benefits.
THE CLINICAL PERSPECTIVE: CONTENT MATTERS
The complex nature of the mind-wandering phenomena
demands that we adopt a more nuanced view of self-generated
thought and this is especially important for relating the con-
cept to psychological wellbeing. In addition to the context
with which self-generated thought occurs, an additional ele-
ment of mind-wandering that is likely to be important to con-
sider is the content underlying the experience (Watkins, 2008).
Profiles of thought content often vary widely across individu-
als, and this variability must be taken into consideration before
making general conclusions about the adaptive nature of self-
generated thought. While some forms of thought content are
linked to maladaptive outcomes including psychological distress
and unhappiness, other forms highlight the adaptive nature of the
experience.
Evidence supporting an unconstructive view of self-generated
thought comes from studies linking the mind-wandering state
to unhappiness (Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010) and mind-
wandering about the past to negative mood (Smallwood and
O’Connor, 2011). Of clinical relevance, repetitive thoughts
focused on negative, self-related content represent core features of
depressive rumination—a style of thinking elevated in individuals
with depression and anxiety (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Watkins,
2008). Depressed and suicidal individuals also exhibit over gen-
eral memories and future thoughts with fewer episodic details
(Raes et al., 2005; Williams et al., 2007). Collectively, these find-
ings foster the sentiment that self-generated thoughts are mal-
adaptive because they impede happiness and reduce psychological
well-being.
However, these findings stand in stark contrast to a grow-
ing number of studies revealing that in non-clinical populations,
self-generated thought is characterized by content of a far more
adaptive and constructive nature (reviewed in Smallwood and
Schooler, 2006; Baars, 2010; Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Smallwood,
2013a,b). The finding that self-generated thought is highly self-
relevant is consistent with the notion that such thoughts provide
a means to focus on and solve one’s current concerns (Klinger,
1971, 2009; Smallwood et al., 2011). On a related note, self-
generated thoughts also facilitate insight and creative problem
solving (Baird et al., 2012), and in contrast to depressed patients
they are often positive in valence (Killingsworth and Gilbert,
2010) and marked by a moderate amount of visual imagery
(Delamillieure et al., 2010). Importantly, the temporal dynam-
ics of self-generated thought also speaks to its adaptive potential.
A majority of individuals’ thoughts are spent engaged in mental
time-travel, particularly oriented toward the future and in pur-
suit of future goals (Smallwood et al., 2009a,b; Smallwood and
O’Connor, 2011; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Baird et al., 2011;
Stawarczyk et al., 2011; Song and Wang, 2012). From an evolu-
tionary perspective, prospection allows us to simulate plausible
outcomes to alternative future events, including the emotional
states of ourselves and other people in response to such events
(Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). In this way self-generated thought
is an adaptive process that helps us select the optimal course of
action, prepare for upcoming events, and achieve our upcom-
ing goals (Schacter et al., 2007; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007;
Suddendorf et al., 2009; Szpunar, 2010). More broadly, mental
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time travel about the past and future provides us with a sense of
self-identity and continuity across time (Tulving, 1985; Prebble
et al., 2013). Additionally, both prospective and past-oriented
thoughts are often characterized by a recent and immediate focus
(Spreng and Levine, 2006; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010), inviting
the speculation that such thoughts provide a means to consoli-
date recent and upcoming experiences into long-term memory
(Wamsley and Stickgold, 2010; Andrews-Hanna, 2012).
The relationship between the content of self-generated
thought and mood may be even more complex. Recent work
exploring the temporal dynamics of the link between the con-
tent of self-generated thought, and mood demonstrate that the
relationship may have a complex temporal relationship. Using
time lag analysis, Ruby et al. (under revision) demonstrated that
the occurrence of past related off task thought while participants
performed a simple non-demanding task was associated with sub-
sequent reports of negative mood. By contrast, self-generated
thought focused on the future was associated with a subsequent
more positive mood. Similarly, Franklin et al. (in submission)
demonstrated that in daily life when self-generated thoughts are
rated asmore interesting, mood wasmore positive. These findings
suggest that the content of self-generated thought is important in
determining its consequence on subsequent mood.
Based on these findings, we propose our second hypothesis
regarding factors that constrain the costs and benefits of self-
generated thought. The content regulation hypotheses (Box 2)
suggests that the relationship between self-generated thought and
psychological wellbeing depends on assessing how individuals reg-
ulate the content of their mental experiences so as to maximize
thoughts with a productive outcomes, and minimize those which are
detrimental to their happiness or other life outcomes. This hypoth-
esis assumes that the mind-wandering is a heterogeneous, rather
than a homogeneous state, and thus it might not make sense
Box 2 | The Content Regulation Hypothesis.
The capacity to regulate the content of self-generated thought
(SGT) so as to maximize the productivity of the experience is
indicative of a cognitive system that is functioning in an adaptive
manner.
- SGT focused on the future may allow individuals to
anticipate and plan their futures.
In normative terms SGT is focused on the future and ori-
ented toward one’s personal goals (Smallwood et al., 2009b;
Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Baird et al., 2011; Song and
Wang, 2012).
- SGT focused on the past can be a indicative of distress
and unhappiness.
SGTs are often oriented toward the past and focused on neg-
ative topics under conditions of unhappiness (Smallwood and
O’Connor, 2011; Stawarczyk et al., 2013).
- Experimental considerations.
The adaptive value of different thought content may vary
across situations. Ruminating on the past thought maybe gen-
erally unproductive, whereas if future related thought takes
the form of worry it could also be problematic.
The adaptive value of SGT can also depend on the personality
and cognitive capacities of the individual.
for intervention studies to seek to reduce self-generated thought
per se. Instead techniques could focus on changing the content
of the experience that is disruptive to an individual’s health and
well-being without impacting upon the obvious benefits that self-
generated thought conveys to the individual. For example, inter-
ventions aimed at reducing negatively-valenced, retrospectively
focused, or abstract repetitive styles of thinking usingmindfulness-
based or other cognitive therapeutic approaches may help break
the cycle linking off task thought to transient and long-lasting
unhappiness (Teasdale et al., 2002). It would also be of interest to
identify whether training that favors mindfulness alters the con-
tent of mind-wandering as well as its occurrence. A clear research
priority, however, should be the non-judgmental gathering of nor-
mative data on how different features of mind-wandering levels
vary across situations, cultures and psychological conditions to
provide empirical information on what constitutes abnormal con-
tent for self-generated thought and what forms of content help the
individual fulfill his or her personal goals.
MOVING FORWARD: TOWARDS A NUANCED UNDERSTANDING OF THE
MIND-WANDERING STATE
Complex problems have simple easy to understand wrong answers.
Henry Louis Mencken (1880–1956)
Empirical work conducted over the last decade has realized the
psychological costs and benefits associated with mind-wandering
and it is important that this research continues. In order to
move beyond this descriptive analysis of the experience of mind-
wandering, however, it is necessary to embrace the fact that
phenomena as intricate as self-generated thought require expla-
nations that are sufficiently complex. Recognizing that self-
generated thought depends on multiple cognitive processes and
is thus dependent on an individual’s profile of affective traits,
cognitive ability, or motivation requires that we should acknowl-
edge that not every experimental finding on mind-wandering
should generalize across every person and situation. With this
knowledge in hand, we should design our experiments so that
we can elucidate the scientific principles that explain how task
contexts interact with individual differences to produce different
forms of self-generated thought. Likewise evidence that mind-
wandering is associated both with costs and benefits require that
we design intervention studies carefully so that we curtail only
those aspects of mind-wandering that impair psychological well-
being. Finally, at a conceptual level we need to acknowledge that
the capacity to generate thoughts that do not arise from the envi-
ronmental input to which we are exposed is far more than a
failure to constrain attention to perception; it reflects an evolu-
tionary adaptation that allows agents to perform actions that are
not simply a reflexive response to the outside world. The capac-
ity for freedom from immediacy prevents our thoughts from
being tied to events in the perceptual moment and self-generated
thoughts that are not related to environmental input are simply
highly developed example of this highly valuable cognitive capac-
ity. As experiencers we may understand mind-wandering as an
unintended lapse; as scientists we should take the study of self-
generated thought seriously because it can reveal core features of
how thinking operates.
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